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Abstract. We consider the problem of defining the information leakage in in-
teractive systems where secrets and observables can alternate during the com-
putation. We show that the information-theoretic approach which interprets such
systems as (simple) noisy channels is not valid anymore. However, the principle
can be recovered if we consider more complicated types of channels, that in Infor-
mation Theory are known as channels with memory and feedback. We show that
there is a complete correspondence between interactive systems and such kind of
channels. Furthermore, we show that the capacity of the channels associated to
such systems is a continuous function of the Kantorovich metric.
1 Introduction
Information leakage refers to the problem that the observable parts of the behavior of
a system may reveal information that we would like to keep secret. In recent years,
there has been a growing interest in the quantitative aspects of this problem, partly
because it is convenient to represent the partial knowledge of the secrets as a probability
distribution, and partly because the mechanisms to protect the information may use
randomization to obfuscate the relation between the secrets and the observables.
Among the quantitative approaches, some of the most popular ones are based on
Information Theory [5, 12, 4, 16]. The system is interpreted as an information-theoretic
channel, where the secrets are the input and the observables are the output. The channel
matrix is constituted by the conditional probabilities p(b | a), defined as the measure
of the executions that give observable b within those which contain the secret a. The
leakage is represented by the mutual information, and the worst-case leakage by the
capacity of the channel.
In the above works, the secret value is assumed to be chosen at the beginning of
the computation. In this paper, we are interested in Interactive systems, i.e. systems
in which secrets and observables can alternate during the computation, and influence
each other. Examples of interactive protocols include auction protocols like [21, 18,
17]. Some of these have become very popular thanks to their integration in Internet-
based electronic commerce platforms [9, 10, 14]. As for interactive programs, examples
include web servers, GUI applications, and command-line programs [3].
We investigate the applicability of the information-theoretic approach to interactive
systems. In [8] it was proposed to define the matrix elements p(b | a) as the measure of
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the traces with (secret, observable)-projection (a, b), divided by the measure of the trace
with secret projection a. This follows the definition of conditional probability in terms
of joint and marginal probability. However, it does not define an information-theoretic
channel. In fact, by definition a channel should be invariant with respect to the input
distribution, and such construction is not, as shown by the following example.
Example 1. Figure 1 represents a web-based interaction between one seller and two
possible buyers, rich and poor. The seller offers two different products, cheap and ex-
pensive, with given probabilities. Once the product is offered, each buyer may try to
buy the product, with a certain probability. For simplicity we assume that the buyers
offers are exclusive. We assume that the offers are observables, in the sense that they
are made public in the website, while the identity of the buyer that actually buys the
product should be secret to an external observer. The symbols r, s, t, r, s, t represent
the probabilities, with the convention that r = 1− r.
r r
s s t t
cheap expensive
poor rich poor rich
Fig. 1. Inter. System
Following [8] we can compute the conditional probabili-
ties as p(b|a) = p(a,b)p(a) , thus obtaining the matrix on Table 1.
However, the matrix is not invariant with respect to the
input distribution. For instance, if we fix r = r = 0.5 and
consider two different input distributions, obtained by vary-
ing the values of (s, t), we get two different matrices of condi-
tional probabilities, which are represented in Table 2. Hence
when the secrets occur after the observables we cannot con-
sider the conditional probabilities as representing a (classical)
channel, and we cannot apply the standard information-theoretic concepts. In particular,
we cannot adopt the (classical) capacity to represent the worst-case leakage, since the
capacity is defined using a fixed channel matrix over all possible input distributions.
cheap expensive
poor rsrs+rt
rt
rs+rt
rich rs
rs+rt
rt
rs+rt
Table 1. Cond. proba-
bilities of Example 1
The first contribution of this paper is to consider an exten-
sion of the theory of channels which makes the information-
theoretic approach applicable also the case of interactive sys-
tems. It turns out that a richer notion of channels, known in
Information Theory as channels with memory and feedback,
serves our purposes. The dependence of inputs on previous
outputs corresponds to feedback, and the dependence of out-
puts on previous inputs and outputs corresponds to memory.
cheap expensive Input dist.
poor 2
5
3
5
p(poor) = 1
2
rich 3
5
2
5
p(rich) = 1
2
(a) r = 1
2
, s = 2
5
, t = 3
5
cheap expensive Input dist.
poor 1
4
3
4
p(poor) = 1
5
rich 9
16
7
16
p(rich) = 4
5
(b) r = 1
2
, s = 1
10
, t = 3
10
Table 2. Two different channel matrices induced by two different input distributions
A second contribution of our work is the proof that the
channel capacity is a continuous function of the Kantorovich metric on interactive sys-
tems. This was pointed out also in [8], however their construction does not work in our
case due to the fact that (as far as we understand) it assumes that the probability of a se-
cret action, in any point of the computation, is not 0. This assumption is not guaranteed
in our case and therefore we had to proceed differently.
A more complete version of this paper (with proofs) is on line [1].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Concepts from Information Theory
For more detailed information on this part we refer to [6]. Let A,B denote two random
variables with corresponding probability distributions pA(·), pB(·), respectively. We
shall omit the subscripts when they are clear from the context. LetA = {a1, . . . , an},B =
{b1, . . . , bm} denote, respectively, the sets of possible values for A and for B.
The entropy of A is defined as H(A) = −∑A p(ai) log p(ai) and it measures the
uncertainty of A. It takes its minimum value H(A) = 0 when pA(·) is a delta of Dirac.
The maximum value H(A) = log |A| is obtained when pA(·) is the uniform distribu-
tion. Usually the base of the logarithm is set to be 2 and the entropy is measured in
bits. The conditional entropy of A given B is H(A|B) = −∑B p(bi)∑A p(aj |bi)
log p(aj |bi), and it measures the uncertainty of A when B is known. We can prove that
0 ≤ H(A|B) ≤ H(A). The minimum value, 0, is obtained when A is completely de-
termined by B. The maximum value H(A) is obtained when A and B are independent.
The mutual information between A and B is defined as I(A;B) = H(A) −H(A|B),
and it measures the amount of information about A that we gain by observing B. It can
be shown that I(A;B) = I(B;A) and 0 ≤ I(A;B) ≤ H(A).
The entropy and mutual information respect the chain laws. Namely, given a se-
quence of random variables A1, A2, . . . , Ak and B, we have:
H(A1, A2, . . . , Ak) =
k∑
i=1
H(Ai|A1, . . . , Ai−1) (1)
I(A1, A2, . . . , Ak;B) =
k∑
i=1
I(Ai;B|A1, . . . , Ai−1) (2)
A (discrete memoryless) channel is a tuple (A,B, p(·|·)), where A,B are the sets of
input and output symbols, respectively, and p(bj |ai) is the probability of observing
the output symbol bj when the input symbol is ai. An input distribution p(ai) over A
determines, together with the channel, the joint distribution p(ai, bj) = p(ai|bj) · p(ai)
and consequently I(A;B). The maximum I(A;B) over all possible input distributions
is the channel’s capacity. Shannon’s famous result states that the capacity coincides
with the maximum rate by which information can be transmitted using the channel.
In this paper we consider input and output sequences instead of just symbols.
Convention 1. Let A = {a1, . . . , an} be a finite set of n different symbols (alphabet).
When we have a sequence of symbols (ordered in time), we use a Greek letter αt to
denote the symbol at time t. The notation αt stands for the sequence α1α2 . . . αt. For
instance, in the sequence a3a7a5, we have α2 = a7 and α
2 = a3a7.
Convention 2. Let X be a random variable. Xt denotes the sequence of t consecutive
occurrences X1, . . . , Xt of the random variable X .
When the channel is used repeatedly, the discrete memoryless channel described
above represents the case in which the behavior of the channel at the present time does
not depend upon the past history of inputs and outputs. If this assumption does not hold,
then we have a channel with memory. Furthermore, if the outputs from the channel can
be fed back to the encoder, thus influencing the generation of the next input symbol,
then the channel is said to be with feedback; otherwise it is without feedback.
Equation 3 makes explicit the probabilistic behavior of channels regarding those
classifications. Suppose a general channel fromA to B with the associated random vari-
ables A for input and B for output. Using the notation introduced in Convention 1, the
channel behavior after T uses can be fully described by the joint probability p(αT , βT ).
Using probability laws we derive:
p(αT , βT ) =
T∏
t=1
p(αt|αt−1, βt−1)p(βt|αt, βt−1) (by the expansion law) (3)
The first term p(αt|αt−1, βt−1) indicates that the probability of αt depends not
only on αt−1, but also on βt−1 (feedback). The second term p(βt|αt, βt−1) indicates
that the probability of each βt depends on previous history of inputs α
t and outputs
βt−1 (memory).
If the channel is without feedback, then we have that p(αt|αt−1, βt−1) = p(αt|αt−1),
and if the channel is without memory, then we have also p(βt|αt, βt−1) = p(βt|αt).
From these we derive p(βT |αT ) = ∏Tt=1 p(βt|αt), which is the classic equation for
discrete memoryless channels without feedback.
Let (V,K) be a Borel space and let (X ,BX ) and (Y,BY) be Polish spaces equipped
with their Borel σ-algebras. Let ρ(dx|v) be a family of measures on X given V . Then
ρ(dx|v) is a stochastic kernel if and only if and only if ρ(·|v) is a random variable from
V into the power set P(X ).
2.2 Probabilistic automata
A function µ : S → [0, 1] is a discrete probability distribution on a countable set S if∑
s∈S µ(s) = 1 and µ(s) ≥ 0 for all s. The set of all discrete probability distributions
on S is D(S).
A probabilistic automaton [15] is a quadrupleM = (S,L, sˆ, ϑ) where S is a count-
able set of states, L a finite set of labels or actions, sˆ the initial state, and ϑ a transition
function ϑ : S → ℘f (D(L × S)). Here ℘f (X) is the set of all finite subsets of X . If
ϑ(s) = ∅ then s is a terminal state. We write s→µ for µ ∈ ϑ(s), s ∈ S. Moreover, we
write s `→r for s, r ∈ S whenever s→µ and µ(`, r) > 0. A fully probabilistic automa-
ton is a probabilistic automaton satisfying |ϑ(s)| ≤ 1 for all states. When ϑ(s) 6= ∅ we
overload the notation and denote ϑ(s) the distribution outgoing from s.
A path in a probabilistic automaton is a sequence σ = s0
`1→ s1 `2→ · · · where
si ∈ S , `i ∈ L and si`i+1→ si+1. A path can be finite in which case it ends with a state.
A path is complete if it is either infinite or finite ending in a terminal state. Given a
finite path σ, last(σ) denotes its last state. Let Pathss(M) denote the set of all paths,
Paths?s(M) the set of all finite paths, and CPathss(M) the set of all complete paths
of an automaton M , starting from the state s. We will omit s if s = sˆ. Paths are ordered
by the prefix relation, which we denote by ≤. The trace of a path is the sequence of
actions in L∗ ∪ L∞ obtained by removing the states, hence for the above σ we have
trace(σ) = l1l2 . . .. If L′ ⊆ L, then traceL′(σ) is the projection of trace(σ) on the
elements of L′.
Let M = (S,L, sˆ, ϑ) be a (fully) probabilistic automaton, s ∈ S a state, and let
σ ∈ Paths?s(M) be a finite path starting in s. The cone generated by σ is the set of
complete paths 〈σ〉 = {σ′ ∈ CPathss(M) | σ ≤ σ′}. Given a fully probabilistic
automaton M = (S,L, sˆ, ϑ) and a state s, we can calculate the probability value,
denoted byPs(σ), of any finite path σ starting in s as follows:Ps(s) = 1 andPs(σ
`→
s′) = Ps(σ) µ(`, s′), where last(σ)→ µ.
Let Ωs , CPathss(M) be the sample space, and let Fs be the smallest σ-algebra
generated by the cones. ThenP induces a unique probability measure on Fs (which we
will also denote by Ps) such that Ps(〈σ〉) = Ps(σ) for every finite path σ starting in
s. For s = sˆ we write P instead of Psˆ.
Given a probability space (Ω,F , P ) and two events A,B ∈ F with P (B) > 0, the
conditional probability of A given B, P (A | B), is defined as P (A ∩B)/P (B).
3 Discrete channels with memory and feedback
We adopt the model proposed in [19] for discrete channels with memory and feedback.
Such model, represented in Figure 2, can be decomposed in sequential components
as follows. At time t the internal channel’s behavior is represented by the conditional
probabilities p(βt|αt, βt−1). The internal channel takes the input αt and, according to
the history of inputs and outputs up to the moment αt, βt−1, produces an output symbol
βt. The output is then fed back to the encoder with delay one. On the other side, at time
t the encoder takes the message and the past output symbols βt−1, and produces a
channel input symbol αt. At final time T the decoder takes all the channel outputs β
T
and produces the decoded message Wˆ . The order is the following:
Message W, α1, β1, α2, β2, . . . , αT , βT , Decoded Message Wˆ
Let us describe such channel in more detail. LetA and B be two finite sets. Let {At}Tt=1
(channel’s input) and {Bt}Tt=1 (channel’s output) be families of random variables in A
and B respectively. Moreover, let AT and BT represent their T -fold product spaces. A
channel is a family of stochastic kernels {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1.
LetFt be the set of all measurable maps ϕt : Bt−1 → A endowed with a probability
distribution, and let Ft be the corresponding random variable. Let FT , FT denote the
W //
Code-
Functions
ϕT
ϕt //
Encoder
{αt = ϕt(βt−1)}Tt=1
αt //
Channel
{p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1
βt //
oo
Decoder
Wˆ = γ(βT )
//Wˆ
Time 0 Delay
βt−1
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Time T + 1
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Time
t = 1 . . . T
Fig. 2. Model for discrete channel with memory and feedback
Cartesian product on the domain and the random variable, respectively. A channel code
function is an element ϕT = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕT ) ∈ FT .
Note that, by probability laws, p(ϕT ) =
∏T
t=1 p(ϕt|ϕt−1). Hence the distribution
onFT is uniquely determined by a sequence {p(ϕt|ϕt−1)}Tt=1. We will use the notation
ϕt(βt−1) to represent the A-valued t-tuple (ϕ1, ϕ2(β1), . . . , ϕt(βt−1)).
In Information Theory this kind of channels are used to encode and transmit mes-
sages. If W is a message set of cardinality M with typical element w, endowed with
a probability distribution, a channel code is a set of M channel code functions ϕT [w],
interpreted as follows: for message w, if at time t the channel feedback is βt−1, then
the channel encoder outputs ϕt[w](β
t−1). A channel decoder is a map from BT toW
which attempts to reconstruct the input message after observing all the output history
βT from the channel.
3.1 Directed information and capacity of channels with feedback
In classical Information Theory, the channel capacity, which is related to the channel’s
transmission rate by Shannon’s fundamental result, can be obtained as the supremum of
the mutual information over all possible input’s distributions. In presence of feedback,
however, this correspondence does not hold anymore. More specifically, mutual infor-
mation does not represent any longer the information flow from αT to βT . Intuitively,
this is due to the fact that mutual information expresses correlation, and therefore it
is increased by feedback. But the feedback, i.e the way the output influences the next
input, is part of the a priori knowledge, and therefore should not be counted when we
measure the output’s contribution to the reduction of the uncertainty about the input. If
we want to maintain the correspondence with the transmission rate and with information
flow, we need to replace mutual information with directed information [13].
Definition 1. In a channel with feedback, the directed information from input AT to
output BT is defined as I(AT → BT ) = ∑Tt=1 I(αt;βt|βt−1). In the other di-
rection, the directed information from BT to AT is defined as: I(BT → AT ) =∑T
t=1 I(αt;β
t−1|αt−1).
Note that the directed information defined above are not symmetric: the flow from
AT to BT takes into account the correlation between αt and βt, while the flow from
BT to AT is based on the correlation between βt−1 and αt . Intuitively, this is because
αt influences βt, but, in the other direction, it is β
t−1 that influences αt.
It can be proved [19] that I(AT ;BT ) = I(AT → BT )+I(BT → AT ). If a channel
does not have feedback, then I(BT → AT ) = 0 and I(AT ;BT ) = I(AT → BT ).
In a channel with feedback the information transmitted is the directed information,
and not the mutual information. The following example should help understanding why.
Example 2. Consider the discrete memoryless channel with input alphabetA = {a1, a2}
and output alphabet B = {b1, b2} whose matrix is represented in Table 3.
b1 b2
a1 0.5 0.5
a2 0.5 0.5
Table 3. Channel ma-
trix for Example 2
Suppose that the channel is used with feedback, in such a
way that, for all t’s, αt+1 = a1 if βt = b1, and αt+1 = a2 if
βt = b2. It is easy to show that if t ≥ 2 then I(At;Bt) 6= 0.
However, there is no leakage from from At to Bt, since the
rows of the matrix are all equal. We have indeed that I(At →
Bt) = 0, and the mutual information I(At;Bt) is only due to
the feedback information flow I(Bt → At).
The concept of capacity is generalized for channels with feedback as follows. Let
DT = {{p(αt|αt−1, βt−1)}Tt=1} be the set of all input distributions. For finite T , the
capacity of a channel {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1 is:
CT = sup
DT
1
T
I(AT → BT ) (4)
4 Interactive systems as channels with memory and feedback
(General) Interactive Information Hiding Systems ([2]), are a variant of probabilistic
automata in which we separate actions in secret and observable; “interactive” means
that secret and observable actions can interleave and influence each other.
Definition 2. A general IIHS is a quadruple I = (M,A,B,Lτ ), where M is a prob-
abilistic automaton (S,L, sˆ, ϑ), L = A ∪ B ∪ Lτ where A, B, and Lτ are pair-
wise disjoint sets of secret, observable, and internal actions respectively, and ϑ(s) ⊆
D(B ∪ Lτ × S) implies |ϑ(s)| ≤ 1, for all s. The condition on ϑ ensures that all
observable transitions are fully probabilistic.
Assumption In this paper we assume that general IIHSs are normalized, i.e. once un-
folded, all the transitions between two consecutive levels have either secret labels only,
or observable labels only. Moreover, the occurrences of secret and observable labels
alternate between levels. We will call secret states the states from which only secrets-
labeled transitions are possible, and observable states the others. Finally, we assume
that for every s and ` there exists a unique r such that s `→ r. Under this assumption we
have that the traces of a computation determine the final state, as expressed by the next
proposition. In the following traceA and traceB indicate the projection of the traces on
secret and observable actions, respectively. Given a general IIHS, it is always possible
to find an equivalent one that satisfies this assumptions. The interested reader can find
in [1] the formal definition of the transformation.
Proposition 1. Let I = (M,A,B,Lτ ) be a general IIHS. Consider two paths σ and
σ′. Then, traceA(σ) = traceA(σ′) and traceB(σ) = traceB(σ′) implies σ = σ′.
In the following, we will consider two particular cases: the fully probabilistic IIHSs,
where there is no nondeterminism, and the secret -nondeterministic IIHSs, where each
secret choice is fully nondeterministic. The latter will be called simply IIHSs.
Definition 3. Let I = ((S,L, sˆ, ϑ),A,B,Lτ ) be a general IIHS. Then I is:
– fully probabilistic if ϑ(s) ⊆ D(A× S) implies |ϑ(s)| ≤ 1 for each s ∈ S.
– secret-nondeterministic if ϑ(s) ⊆ D(A×S) implies that for each s ∈ S there exist
si’ such that ϑ(s) = {δ(ai, si)}ni=1.
We show now how to construct a channel with memory and feedback from IIHSs.
We will see that an IIHS corresponds precisely to a channel as determined by its stochas-
tic kernel, while a fully probabilistic IIHS determines, additionally, the input distribu-
tion. In the following, we consider an IIHS I = ((S,L, sˆ, ϑ),A,B,Lτ ) is in normal-
ized form. Given a path σ of length 2t− 1, we denote traceA(σ) by αt, and traceB(σ)
by βt−1.
Definition 4. For each t, the channel’s stochastic kernel corresponding to I is defined
as p(βt|αt, βt−1) = ϑ(q)(βt, q′), where q is the state reached from the root via the path
σ whose input-trace is αt and output trace βt−1.
Note that q and q′ in previous definitions are well defined: by Proposition 1, q is
unique, and since the choice of βt is fully probabilistic, q
′ is also unique.
If I is fully probabilistic, then it determines also the input distribution and the de-
pendency of αt upon β
t−1 (feedback) and αt−1.
Definition 5. If I is fully probabilistic, the associated channel has a conditional input
distribution for each t defined as p(αt|αt−1, βt−1) = ϑ(q)(αt, q′), where q is the state
reached from the root via the path σ whose input-trace is αt−1 and output trace is βt−1.
4.1 Lifting the channel inputs to reaction functions
Definitions 4 and 5 define the joint probabilities p(αt, βt) for a fully probabilistic IIHS.
We still need to show in what sense these define a information-theoretic channel.
The {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1 determined by the IIHS correspond to a channel’s stochas-
tic kernel. The problem resides in the conditional probability of {p(αt|αt−1, βt−1)}Tt=1.
In an information-theoretic channel, the value of αt is determined in the encoder by a
deterministic function ϕt(β
t−1). However, inside the encoder there is no possibility for
a probabilistic description of αt. Furthermore, in our setting the concept of encoder
makes no sense as there is no information to encode. A solution to this problem is to
externalize the probabilistic behavior of αt: the code functions become simple reaction
functions ϕt that depend only on β
t−1 (the message w does not play a role any more),
and these reaction functions are endowed with a probability distribution that generates
the probabilistic behavior of the values of αt.
Definition 6. A reactor is a distribution on reaction functions, i.e., a stochastic ker-
nel {p(ϕt|ϕt−1)}Tt=1. A reactor R is consistent with a fully probabilistic IIHS I if it
induces the compatible distribution Q(ϕT , αT , βT ) such that, for every 1 ≤ t ≤ T ,
Q(αt|αt−1, βt−1) = p(αt|αt−1, βt−1), where the latter is the probability distribution
induced by I.
The main result of this section states that for any fully probabilistic IIHS there is a
reactor that generates the probabilistic behavior of the IIHS.
Theorem 3. Given a fully probabilistic IIHS I , we can construct a channel with mem-
ory and feedback, and probability distribution Q(ϕT , αT , βT ), which corresponds to I
in the sense that, for every t,αt and βt, with 1 ≤ t ≤ T ,Q(αt, βt) def= ∑ϕT Q(ϕT , αt, βt) =
p(αt, βt) holds, where p(αt, βt) is the joint probability of input and output traces in-
duced by I.
Corollary 1. Let a I be a fully probabilistic IIHS. Let {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1 be a se-
quence of stochastic kernels and {p(αt|αt−1, βt−1)}Tt=1 a sequence of input distribu-
tions defined by I according to Definitions 4 and 5. Then the reactorR = {p(ϕt|ϕt−1)}Tt=1
compatible with respect to the I is given by:
p(ϕ1) = p(α1|α0, β0) = p(α1) (5)
p(ϕt|ϕt−1) =
∏
βt−1
p(ϕt(β
t−1)|ϕt−1(βt−2), βt−1), 2 ≤ t ≤ T (6)
Figure 3 depicts the model for IIHS. Note that, in relation to Figure 2, there are
some simplifications: (1) no message w is needed; (2) the decoder is not used. At the
beginning, a reaction function sequence ϕT is chosen and then the channel is used
T times. At each usage t, the encoder decides the next input symbol αt based on the
reaction function ϕt and the output fed back β
t−1. Then the channel produces an output
βt based on the stochastic kernel p(βt|αt, βt−1). The output is then fed back to the
encoder with a delay one.
Reaction-
Functions
ϕT
ϕt //
“Interactor”
{αt = ϕt(βt−1)}Tt=1
αt //
Channel
{p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1
βt //
ooDelay
βt−1
OO
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Fig. 3. Channel with memory and feedback model for IIHS
We conclude this section by remarking an intriguing coincidence: The notion of
reaction function sequence ϕT , on the IIHSs, corresponds to the notion of deterministic
scheduler. In fact, each reaction function ϕt selects the next step, αt, on the basis of the
βt−1 and αt−1 (generated by ϕt−1), and βt−1, αt−1 represent the path until that state.
5 Leakage in Interactive Systems
In this section we propose a notion of information flow based on our model. We fol-
low the idea of defining leakage and maximum leakage using the concepts of mutual
information and capacity (see for instance [4]), making the necessary adaptations.
Since the directed information I(AT → BT ) is a measure of how much information
flows from AT to BT in a channel with feedback (cfr. Section 3.1), it is natural to
consider it as a measure of leakage of information by the protocol.
Definition 7. The information leakage of an IIHS is defined as: I(AT → BT ) =∑T
t=1H(At|At−1, Bt−1)−H(AT |BT ).
Note that
∑T
t=1H(At|At−1, Bt−1) can be seen as the entropy HR of reactor R.
Compare this definition with the classical Information-theoretic approach to infor-
mation leakage: when there is no feedback, the leakage is defined as:
I(AT ;BT ) = H(AT )−H(AT |BT ) (7)
The principle behind (7) is that the leakage is equal to the difference between the a
priori uncertainty H(AT ) and the a posteriori uncertainty H(AT |BT ) (gain in knowl-
edge about the secret by observing the output). Our definition maintains the same prin-
ciple, with the proviso that the a priori uncertainty is now represented by HR.
5.1 Maximum leakage as capacity
In the case of secret-nondeterministic IIHS, we have a stochastic kernel but no distri-
bution on the code functions. In this case it seems natural to consider the worst leakage
over all possible distributions on code functions. This is exactly the concept of capacity.
Definition 8. The maximum leakage of an IIHS is defined as the capacity CT of the
associated channel with memory and feedback.
6 Modeling IIHSs as channels: An example
In this section we show the application of our approach to the Cocaine Auction Proto-
col [17]. Let us imagine a situation where several mob individuals are gathered around
a table. An auction is about to be held in which one of them offers his next shipment
of cocaine to the highest bidder. The seller describes the merchandise and proposes a
starting price. The others then bid increasing amounts until there are no bids for 30
consecutive seconds. At that point the seller declares the auction closed and arranges a
secret appointment with the winner to deliver the goods.
The basic protocol is fairly simple and is organized as a succession of rounds of
bidding. Round i starts with the seller announcing the bid price bi for that round. Buyers
have t seconds to make an offer (i.e. to say yes, meaning “I’m willing to buy at the
current bid price bi”). As soon as one buyer anonymously says yes, he becomes the
winner wi of that round and a new round begins. If nobody says anything for t seconds,
round i is concluded by timeout and the auction is won by the winner wi−1 of the
previous round, if one exists. If the timeout occurs during round 0, this means that
nobody made any offers at the initial price b0, so there is no sale.
Although our framework allows the forrmalization of this protocol for an arbitrary
number of bidders and bidding rounds, for illustration purposes, we will consider the
case of two bidders (Candlemaker and Scarface) and two rounds of bids. Furthermore,
we assume that the initial bid is always 1 dollar, so the first bid does not need to be
announced by the seller. In each turn the seller can choose how much he wants to
increase the actual bid. This is done by adding an increment to the last bid. There
are two options of increments, namely inc1 (1 dollar) and inc2 (2 dollars). In that way,
bi+1 is either bi + inc1 or bi + inc2. We can describe this protocol as a normalized
IIHS I = (M,A,B,Lτ ), where A = {Candlemaker,Scarface, a∗} is the set of secret
actions, B = {inc1, inc2, b∗} is the set of observable actions, Lτ = ∅ is the set of
hidden actions, and the probabilistic automatonM is represented in Figure 4. For clarity
reasons, we omit transitions with probability 0 in the automaton. Note that the special
secret action a∗ represents the situation where neither Candlemaker nor Scarface bid.
The special observable action b∗ is only possible after no one has bidden, and signalizes
the end of the auction and, therefore, no bid is allowed anymore.
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Fig. 4. Cocaine Auction example
Table 4 shows all the stochastic kernels for this example. The formalization of this
protocol in terms of IIHSs using our framework makes it possible to prove the claim
in[17] suggesting that if the seller knows the identity of the bidders then the (strong)
anonymity guaranties are not provided anymore.
7 Topological properties of IIHSs and their Capacity
In this section we show how to extend to IIHSs the notion of pseudometric defined
in [8] for Concurrent Labelled Markov Chains, and we prove that the capacity of the
corresponding channels is a continuous function on this pseudometric. The metric con-
struction is sound for general IIHSs, but the result on capacity is only valid for secret-
nondeterministic IIHSs.
Given a set of states S, a pseudometric (or distance) is a function d that yields a
non-negative real number for each pair of states and satisfies the following: d(s, s) = 0;
α1 → β1 inc1 inc2 b∗
Candlemaker q4 q5 0
Scarface q6 q7 0
a∗ 0 0 1
(a) t=1, p(β1|α1, β0)
α1, β1, α2 → β2 Cheap Expensive b∗
Candlemaker,inc1,Candlemaker q22 q23 0
Candlemaker,inc1,Scarface q24 q25 0
Candlemaker,inc1,a∗ 0 0 1
Candlemaker,inc2,Candlemaker q27 q28 0
Candlemaker,inc2,Scarface q29 q30 0
Candlemaker,inc2,a∗ 0 0 1
Scarface,inc1,Candlemaker q32 q33 0
Scarface,inc1,Scarface q34 q35 0
Scarface,inc1,a∗ 0 0 1
Scarface,inc2,Candlemaker q37 q38 0
Scarface,inc2,Scarface q39 q40 0
Scarface,inc2,a∗ 0 0 1
a∗,b∗,a∗ 0 0 1
All other lines 0 0 1
(b) t = 2, p(β2|α2, β1)
Table 4. Stochastic kernels for the Cocaine Auction example.
d(s, t) = d(t, s), and d(s, t) ≤ d(s, u) + d(u, t). We say that a pseudometric d is c-
bounded if ∀s, t : d(s, t) ≤ c, where c is a positive real number. We now define a
complete lattice on pseudometrics, and define the distance between IIHSs as the greatest
fixpoint of a distance transformation, in line with the coinductive theory of bisimilarity.
Definition 9. M is the class of 1-bounded pseudometrics on states with the ordering
d  d′ if ∀s, s′ ∈ S : d(s, s′) ≥ d′(s, s′).
It is easy to see that (M,) is a complete lattice. In order to define pseudometrics
on IIHSs, we now need to lift the pseudometrics on states to pseudometrics on distribu-
tions in D(L× S). Following standard lines [20, 8, 7], we apply the construction based
on the Kantorovich metric [11].
Definition 10. For d ∈ M, and µ, µ′ ∈ D(L × S), we define d(µ, µ′) (overloading
the notation d) as d(µ, µ′) = max
∑
(`i,si)∈L×S(µ(`i, si) − µ′(`i, si))xi where the
maximization is on all possible values of the xi’s, subject to the constraints 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1
and xi − xj ≤ dˆ((`i, si), (`j , sj)), where dˆ((`i, si), (`j , sj)) = 1 if `i 6= `j , and
dˆ((`i, si), (`j , sj)) = d(si, sj) otherwise.
It can be shown that with this definition m is a pseudometric on D(L × S).
Definition 11. d ∈M is a bisimulation metric if, for all  ∈ [0, 1), d(s, s′) ≤  implies
that if s→ µ, then there exists some µ′ such that s′ → µ′ and d(µ, µ′) ≤ .
The greatest bisimulation metric is dmax =
⊔{d ∈M | d is a bisimulation metric}.
We now characterize dmax as a fixed point of a monotonic function Φ onM. For sim-
plicity, from now on we consider only the distance between states belonging to different
IIHSs with disjoint sets of states.
Definition 12. Given two IIHSs with transition relations θ and θ′ respectively, and a
preudometric d on states, define Φ :M→M as:
Φ(d)(s, s′) =

maxi d(si, s
′
i) if ϑ(s) = {δ(a1,s1), . . . , δ(am,sm)}
and ϑ′(s′) = {δ(a1,s′1), . . . , δ(am,s′m)}
d(µ, µ′) if ϑ(s) = {µ} and ϑ′(s′) = {µ′}
0 if ϑ(s) = ϑ′(s′) = ∅
1 otherwise
It is easy to see that the definition of Φ is a particular case of the function F defined
in [8, 7]. Hence it can be proved, by adapting the proofs of the analogous results in [8,
7], that F (d) is a pseudometric, and that d is a bisimulation metric iff d  Φ(d). This
implies that dmax =
⊔{d ∈M | d  Φ(d)}, and still as a particular case of F in [8, 7],
we have thatΦ is monotonic onM. By Tarski’s fixed point theorem, dmax is the greatest
fixed point of Φ. Furthermore, in [1] we show that dmax is indeed a bisimulation metric,
and that it is the greatest bisimulation metric. In addition, the finite branchingness of
IIHSs ensures that the closure ordinal of Φ is ω (cf. Lemma 3.10 in the full version of
[8]). Therefore one can show that dmax = {Φi(>) | i ∈ N}, where > is the greatest
pseudometric (i.e. >(s, s′) = 0 for every s, s′), and Φ0(>) = >.
Given two IIHSs I and I′, with initial states s and s′ respectively, we define the dis-
tance between I and I′ as d(I, I′) = dmax (s, s′). Next theorem states the continuity of
the capacity w.r.t. the metric on IIHSs. It is crucial that they are secret-nondeterministic
(while the definition of the metric holds in general).
Theorem 4. Consider two normalized IIHSs I and I′, and fix a T > 0. For every  > 0
there exists ν > 0 such that if d(I, I′) < ν then |CT (I)− CT (I′)| < .
We conclude this section with an example showing that the continuity result for the
capacity does not hold if the construction of the channel is done starting from a system
in which the secrets are endowed with a probability distribution. This is also the reason
why we could not simply adopt the proof technique of the continuity result in [8] and
we had to come up with a different reasoning.
Example 3. Consider the two following programs, where a1, a2 are secrets, b1, b2 are
observable, ‖ is the parallel operator, and +p is a binary probabilistic choice that assigns
probability p to the left branch, and probability 1− p to the right one.
s) (send(a1) +p send(a2)) ‖ receive(x).output(b2)
t) (send(a1)+q send(a2)) ‖ receive(x).if x = a1 then output(b1) else output(b2).
Table 5 shows the fully probabilistic IIHSs corresponding to these programs, and
their associated channels, which in this case (since the secret actions are all at the top-
level) are classic channels, i.e. memoryless and without feedback. As usual for classic
channels, they do not depend on p and q. It is easy to see that the capacity of the
first channel is 0 and the capacity of the second one is 1. Hence their difference is 1,
independently from p and q.
Let now p = 0 and q = . It is easy to see that the distance between s and t is .
Therefore (when the automata have probabilities on the secrets), the capacity is not a
continuous function of the distance.
s t
p 1−p
0 1 0 1
a1 a2
b1 b2 b1 b2
q 1−q
1 0 0 1
a1 a2
b1 b2 b1 b2
s b1 b2
a1 0 1
a2 0 1
(a)
t b1 b2
a1 1 0
a2 0 1
(b)
Table 5. The IIHSs of Example 3 and their corresponding channels
8 Conclusion and future work
In this paper we have investigated the problem of information leakage in interactive sys-
tems, and we have proved that these systems can be modeled as channels with memory
and feedback. The situation is summarized in Table 6(a). The comparison with the clas-
sical situation of non-interactive systems is represented in (b). Furthermore, we have
proved that the channel capacity is a continuous function of the kantorovich metric.
IIHSs as automata IIHSs as channels Notion of leakage
Normalized IIHSs with nondeterministic Sequence of stochastic kernels Leakage as capacity
inputs and probabilistic outputs {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1
Normalized IIHSs with a deterministic Sequence of stochastic kernels
scheduler solving the nondeterminism {p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1 +
reaction function seq. ϕT
Fully probabilistic normalized IIHSs Sequence of stochastic kernels Leakage as directed
{p(βt|αt, βt−1)}Tt=1 + information I(AT → BT )
reactor {p(ϕt|ϕt−1)}Tt=1
(a)
Classical channels Channels with memory and feedback
The protocol is modeled in independent uses of The protocol is modeled in several
the channel, often a unique use. consecutive uses of the channel.
The channel is from AT → BT , i.e., its input The channel is from F → B, i.e. its
is a single string αT = α1 . . . αT of secret input is a reaction function ϕt and its
symbols and its output is a single string βT = output is an observable βt.
β1 . . . βT of observable symbols.
The channel is memoryless and in general The channel has memory. Despite the fact that the
implicitly it is assumed the absence of channel from F → B does not have
feedback. feedback, the internal stochastic kernels
do.
The capacity is calculated using information The capacity is calculated using mutual
I(AT ;BT ). directed information I(AT → BT ).
(b)
Table 6.
For future work we would like to provide algorithms to compute the leakage and
maximum leakage of interactive systems. These problems result very challenging given
the exponential growth of reaction functions (needed to compute the leakage) and the
quantification over infinitely many reactors (given by the definition of maximum leak-
age in terms of capacity). One possible solution is to study the relation between deter-
ministic schedulers and sequence of reaction functions. In particular, we believe that
for each sequence of reaction functions and distribution over it there exists a proba-
bilistic scheduler for the automata representation of the secret-nondeterministic IIHS.
In this way, the problem of computing the leakage and maximum leakage would reduce
to a standard probabilistic model checking problem (where the challenge is to compute
probabilities ranging over infinitely many schedulers).
In addition, we plan to investigate measures of leakage for interactive systems other
than mutual information and capacity.
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